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Abstract Much of the EU institution literature deals with the distribution of voting power in the
Council and European Parliament. The increasingly sophisticated models on EU decision mak-
ing tend to overlook issues pertaining agenda formation and control in various decision making
bodies. This article argues that agenda control is extremely important in all collective decision
making bodies. Indeed, agenda control may render the voting power distribution issue largely
irrelevant.
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1. Introduction
The European Union and its predecessors have from the 1980’s onwards been the focus
of much scholarly work. A considerable part of this work has been devoted to deter-
mining the power of various member states in the process whereby the EU policies are
formed. In particular, the Council of Ministers, one of the three main bodies in the EU
machinery, has been under scrutiny. The reason is obvious: throughout the history of
the European Union, the Council has been deemed the ﬁnal arbiter of the community
decision making. Moreover, the Council has for along time resorted to weighted vot-
ing whereby the member states are given voting weights roughly in accordance with
the population sizes. This fact accompanied with the qualiﬁed majority rule has made
the Council a particularly suitable setting for power index applications. Indeed, these
applications of cooperative game theory have mushroomed over the past two decades
bringing back to life concepts long forgotten by many a scholar.
The times of the Council single-handedly deciding all major EU matters are, how-
ever, now gone. The European Parliament has entered the legislative process as a
genuine actor rather than simply as a party to be consulted with before the ﬁnal de-
cisions are dictated by the Council. Currently, the Parliament can not only delay the
decision making but also essentially modify the proposals stemming from Commis-
sion and Council. It has even some power to initiate legislation. These developments
have to some extent been taken into account in scholarly works on EU decision mak-
ing (see e.g. Napel and Widgr´ en 2006), but still today much work deals with only
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one institution, the Council. Undoubtedly, the multi-chamber nature of the EU will be
increasingly recognized in academic studies as well.
Another aspect largely ignored by the scholarly community is the way in which
the decisions are actually being made in the Council. In fact, very little is generally
known about the way in which the Council decisions are reached. Some observers (e.g.
Moberg 2009 and Trzaskowski 2009) have emphasized the absence of actual voting
in the Council. Similarly the account given by Mattila and Lane (2001) suggests that
voting onlyrarelytakes place inthethisbody. Rather—they argue—it isthepresidency
that proposes and modiﬁes decision alternatives to reach a consensus decision—or
at least one apparently supported by the qualiﬁed majority. Thus, while informative
and sometimes useful in institutional design, the power indices—both a priori and
preferential ones—capture but one and seemingly not very important facet of collective
decision making. If the aim is to make EU decision making more efﬁcient, then surely
not just the weight distribution and majority threshold, but also the voting procedures
are of paramount importance. If the decision procedures lead to a stalemate, then even
the most just distribution of voting weights is of no practical consequence.
The way in which the decisions in the EU (and elsewhere) are reached depends not
onlyonthevotingweight(or, ingeneral, resource)distributionandmajoritythresholds,
but also on the voting procedures and agenda formation principles. These are the foci
of the present article. The main results on agenda control and voting procedures are
reviewed in an effort to show that it makes a great deal of difference which voting
system is used. The difference may in some cases be one between Pareto optimal and
sub-optimal outcomes.
There is yet another aspect of EU decision making that is often overlooked in the
institutional design literature, viz. the way in which various issues to be decided upon
are packaged into decision alternatives. This is a very important stage of decision
making and one that often calls forpolitical skill. This articletriesto show that political
skill sometimes plays a quite central role in the formation of public policies. It also
emphasizes the role of agenda in determining the policy outcomes.
2. Some paradoxes of representation
In the study of voting, the power of an actor is usually equated with his/her ability to
change the collective decision making outcomes to his/her advantage. The underlying
idea is that without the presence of the actor, the outcome would be A, but when he/she
enters the scene, the outcome is B and the actor prefers B to A. Prima facie, it would
seem that the more resources (votes, money, friends) an actor has, the more able he/she
is to change the outcome. Hence the commonly held view that the measure of power
should be monotonic in voting resources, i.e. the more resources, the more power.1
While this common view may be correct in some circumstances, it is not true in ge-
neral.2 Consider the following example adapted from Schwartz (1995) (see also Nurmi
1 This view is apparently not held by all students of voting power. E.g. the public good index of Holler
(1982) fails on voting weight monotonicity. See Holler and Napel (2004) and Turnovec (1998).
2 In this section we assume sincere voting, i.e. that the voters vote according to their preferences.
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1999, p. 117). Three parties, 1, 2 and 3 are represented in a 100-member legislature.
They have 23, 28 and 49 seats, respectively. Three policy options A, B and C are on
the table. The parties’s preferences over these alternatives are shown in Table 1 be read
from left to right.





Let alternative A be the status quo, while B and C are two amendments to it. The
widely used parliamentary voting system known as the amendment procedure con-
fronts alternatives with each other in pairs in a predetermined order so that the major-
ity winner of each contest proceeds to face the next one, while the loser is eliminated.
The winner of the ﬁnal comparison is the overall winner. With k alternatives, k−1
comparisons are performed.
Suppose that the voting order is: (i) B vs. C, and (ii) the winner of (i) vs. A. In the
ﬁrst comparison parties 1 and 2 will narrowly defeat party 3, i.e. alternative B wins.
In the second comparison A beats B with a wide margin. This outcome is the worst
possible from the point of view of party 2.
Assume now that party 2 had 4 seats less in the parliament and that these 4 seats
were evenly distributed among the other parties, i.e. both parties 1 and 3 would get 2
seats each more. The redistribution would make C the Condorcet winner alternative,
i.e. one that defeats all the others in pairwise comparisons with a majority of votes.
Eo ipso it wins regardless of the voting order. Thus, less representation brings about a
better outcome for party 2 than more representation.
In the above example less presentation is accompanied with a better outcome than
more representation. This is, however, not the extreme situation. Table 2 exhibits a
setting that is more dramatic than the previous one in two ways: (i) less representation
leads not only to a better outcome, but to the very best possible one, and (ii) this is
achieved when the party in question has no representation at all (Felsenthal 2001). The
setting is an example of the strong version of the no-paradox.3






3 The no-show paradox has been discussed by Fishburn and Brams (1983), Moulin (1988) and P´ erez (2001).
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Let the order of voting and the voting system be the same as in the previous exam-
ple. Then B defeats C in the ﬁrst comparison and B defeats A in the second. Hence, B
is the overall winner. Suppose now that party 4 has no representation at all. In this case
C emerges as the winner of the ﬁrst comparison and is defeated by A in the second.
Thus, party 4’s favorite alternative gets elected if the party has no representation at all,
while 4’s second best alternative is elected if it has 2 seats. So, in some cases a group
of individuals may be better off by no representation at all than with some representa-
tives. This suggests that other considerations than voting weights should be taken into
account in analyzing the determinants of voting outcomes. Two such considerations
are the agenda and the voting procedure.
3. Two agenda procedures
It can be argued that all balloting is preceded by an agenda-formation process. In
political elections, it is often the task of the political parties to suggest candidates. In
committee decisions the agenda-building is typically preceded by a discussion in the
course of which various parties make proposals for the policy to be taken or candidates
for ofﬁces. By agenda-based procedures one usually refers to committee procedures
where the agenda is explicitly decided upon after the decision alternatives are known.
Typical settings of agenda-based procedures are parliaments and committees.
Two procedures stand out among the agenda-based systems: (i) the amendment
and (ii) the successive procedure.4 Both are widely used in contemporary parliaments.
Rasch(1995)reportsthatthelatteristhemostcommonparliamentaryvotingprocedure
in the world. As the amendment procedure it is based on pairwise comparisons so
that at each stage of the procedure an alternative is confronted with all the remaining
alternatives. If it is voted upon by a majority, it is elected and the process is terminated.
Otherwise this alternative is eliminated and the next one is confronted with all the
remaining alternatives. Again the majority decides whether this alternative is elected
and the process terminated, or whether the next alternative is picked up for the next
vote. Eventually one alternative gets the majority support and is elected.
Figure 1 shows an example of a successive agenda where the order of alternatives
to be voted upon is B, A, C, D, E, F and G. Whether this sequence will be followed
through depends on the outcomes of the ballots. In general, the maximum number of
ballots taken of k alternatives is k−1.
As was stated in the preceding section, the amendment procedure confronts al-
ternatives with each other in pairs so that in each ballot two separate alternatives are
compared. Whichever gets the majority of votes proceeds to the next ballot, while
the loser is set aside. Figure 2 shows an example of an amendment agenda over 3
alternatives: A, B and C.
In Figure 2 alternatives A and B are ﬁrst compared and the winner is faced with C
on the second ballot.
4 The terminology in the ﬁeld is somewhat confusing. So, for example, the amendment procedure is some-
times called successive elimination procedure.


































































































Figure 2. The amendment agenda
Both the amendment and successive procedure are very agenda-sensitive systems.
In other words, two agendas may produce different outcomes even though the under-
lying preference ranking of voters and their voting behavior remain the same. Under
sincere voting—whereby for all alternatives A and B the voter always votes for A if
he/she prefers A to B and vice versa—the well-known Condorcet paradox provides an
example: of the three alternatives any one can be rendered the winner depending on the
agenda. To determine the outcomes—even under sincere voting—of successive pro-
cedure requires assumptions regarding voter preferences over subsets of alternatives.
Under the assumption that the voters always vote for the subset of alternatives that
contains their ﬁrst-ranked alternative, the successive procedure is equally vulnerable
to agenda-manipulation as the amendment one, i.e. any alternative can be rendered the
winner in a Condorcet paradox proﬁle.
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4. What is known about agenda-systems
The agenda-based systems have received some attention in the social choice theory.
Thus, we know e.g. the following about the amendment and successive systems:
(i) Condorcet losers are not elected (not even under sincere voting).
(ii) Sophisticated voting avoids the worst possible outcomes.
(iii) Condorcet winner is elected (both under sincere voting and sophisticated) by the
amendment procedure.
(iv) The strong Condorcet winner is elected by both systems.
The ﬁrst point follows from the observation that the alternative that wins under the
amendment procedure has to win against at least one other alternative. Hence, it cannot
be the Condorcet loser. Under the successive procedure if the winner is determined at
the ﬁnal pairwise vote, it cannot be the Condorcet loser. If, on the other hand, the
winner appears earlier, it cannot be the Condorcet loser either because it is ranked ﬁrst
by more than half of the voting body.
Sophisticated voting avoids Pareto violations. In other words, if the voters antici-
pate the outcomes ensuing from various voting strategies, the resulting strategy combi-
nations exclude outcomes for which unanimously preferred outcomes exist (see Miller
1995, p. 87).
That the amendment procedure results in the Condorcet winner under sincere vot-
ing, follows from the deﬁnition. Finally, the strong Condorcet winner—i.e. one that is
ranked ﬁrst by more than half of the electorate—is elected by both systems regardless
of whether the voting is sincere or strategic.
To counterbalance the basically positive results mentioned above, there are some
negative ones. To wit,
(i) McKelvey’s (1979) results on majority rule and agenda-control.
(ii) All Condorcet extensions are vulnerable to the no-show paradox (Moulin 1988).
(iii) Pareto violations are possible under sincere voting.
McKelvey’s well-known theorem states that under fairly general conditions, such
as multi-dimensional policy spaces, continuous utilities over the policy space and em-
pty core, any alternative can become the voting outcome under amendment procedure
if the voters are sincere and myopic. Under these circumstances the agenda-controller
determines the outcome even though at every stage of voting the majority determines
the winner of the pairwise vote. Although some of the conditions are not so liberal
as they seem at ﬁrst sight, the theorem is certainly important in calling attention to the
limits—or rather, lack thereof—that the majority rule per se can impose on the possible
outcomes. The upshot is that the majority rule guarantees no correspondence between
voter opinions and voting outcomes.
Althoughnoanalogousresultontheoutcomesofthesuccessiveprocedureinmulti-
dimensional policy spaces exists, the discussion in the next section shows that it is also
very vulnerable to agenda-manipulation.
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5. The importance of agenda
An obvious corollary of McKelvey’s theorem is that under the stated conditions the
voting outcome may be an alternative that is Pareto dominated, i.e. the winner may
be an alternative that every voter regards worse than another alternative that has been
eliminated in some pairwise comparison “on the way” to the ﬁnal outcome. While
McKelvey’s theorem deals with many-dimensional real spaces, the Pareto violation—
that is the choice of a Pareto dominated alternative—may be encountered in a ﬁnite
alternative setting. The example in Table 3 illustrates.





With sincere voting and agenda (i) A vs. E, (ii) the winner vs. D, (iii) the winner
vs. C, and (iv) the winner vs. B, B wins. Yet, E is preferred to B by everyone. Hence,
we have instance of Pareto violation.
We notice, moreover, that all pairwise comparisons result in 3/4 of the electorate
supporting the winner. Hence, not even this high a majority threshold enables the
amendment procedure to avoid Pareto violations. Indeed, when the number of alterna-
tives exceeds that of the voters, the threshold can be made as high as one vote shy of
unanimity using Saari’s (2001, p. 111) ranking wheel construct.
Table 4 illustrates the case where the majority of 6/7 is needed for victory in pair-
wise comparisons. With the agenda (i) H vs. A, (ii) the winner vs. G, (iii) the winner
vs. F, (iv) the winner vs. E, (v) the winner vs. D, (vi) the winner vs. C, (vii) the winner
vs. B, B wins. However, all voters prefer A to B.
In the above example there is only one alternative that is Pareto superior to the one
elected by the amendment procedure. Saari (2001, p. 100–101) provides a much more
dramatic example which is reproduced in Table 5.
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With the agenda (i) F vs. G, (ii) the winner vs. E, (iii) the winner vs. D, (iv) the
winner vs. C, (v) the winner vs. B, (vi) the winner vs. A, and (vii) the winner vs. H, the
last mentioned wins. Yet, 5 alternatives C, D, E, F, G are unanimously preferred to H.
The successive procedure is also vulnerable to Pareto violations under sincere vot-
ing as shown in Table 6. With sincere voting and agenda (i) A vs. others, (ii) C vs.
others, B wins even though B is Pareto dominated by A. If the majority threshold is
increased the possibility of Pareto violations is not thereby removed.




Consider Table 7 and the agenda (i) A vs. the rest, (ii) B vs. the rest, (iii) C vs. the
rest and (iv) E vs. D. Assume that to win an alternative has to get 4/5 of the vote total.
Under sincere voting E wins (once A and B are eliminated). Yet, alternative A Pareto
dominates E.




So, in amendment and successive procedures agenda is a very important deter-
minant of the voting outcomes, especially under sincere voting. In fact, the above
examples demonstrate that the voting weight plays practically no role in determining
the outcomes. After all, the Pareto violations indicate that the agenda controller can
overrule the entire voting body.
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6. On limits of agenda-control
But surely committees consisting of experienced politicians or experts would not vo-
luntarily agree to be led to decisions that are blatantly against the most obvious ex-
plication of group rationality, viz. Pareto optimality. Indeed, there is an antidote to
agenda manipulation, viz. sophisticated voting. Sophisticated voting by a voter aims at
securing the best possible outcome of the voting process, given the other voters’ voting
strategies; “best” seen from the voter’s point of view.
Sophisticated votingintheamendment procedure hasbeen extensively studiedover
the past decades (Farquharson 1969; McKelvey and Niemi 1978; Gretlein 1983; Banks
1986; Miller 1995; Moulin 1988). The upshot of this research is that, instead of spread-
ing all over the policy space, the sophisticated voting outcomes are always a subset of
the Pareto set, i.e. Pareto violations do not occur if the voters are strategic. More-
over, the sophisticated voting outcomes are in general located in a proper subset of
the uncovered set. This subset is known as the Banks set. Its superset, the uncovered
set consists of alternatives not covered by some other alternatives. The deﬁnition of
covering says that A covers B if (i) A beats B and (ii) A beats everything that B beats.
In the case of successive procedure, sophisticated voting imposes less stringent
constraints on agenda control. To wit, any outcome in the top cycle set can rendered
theoutcomeunderthesuccessiveprocedureifthevotersaresophisticated(Miller1995,
p. 85). The top cycle consists of the smallest set A of alternatives such that all alter-
natives in A beat all alternatives not in A. This set is a superset of the uncovered set
and may even contain Pareto dominated alternatives. So, strategic behavior helps, but
the upshot remains that agenda control is a very important determinant of the voting
outcomes. Indeed, marginal changes in voting weights are of secondary importance
when compared to agenda inﬂuence.
As was shown above, the actors’ inﬂuence over outcomes may sometimes be in-
creased with smaller vote shares. The following example illustrates (see Nurmi and
Hosli 2003). The decision concerns the location of an EU agency. Alternatives are
Brussels, Helsinki and Madrid. For the sake of argument we assume that the distribu-
tion of voting weights over preference rankings of alternatives in the then 15-member
EU is the one presented in Table 8.
Table 8. Agency allocation example
17 votes Brussels ￿ Helsinki ￿ Madrid
30 votes Helsinki ￿ Madrid ￿ Brussels
40 votes Madrid ￿ Brussels ￿ Helsinki
With sincere amendment procedure and agenda (i) Helsinki vs. Madrid, (ii) the
winner vs. Brussels, Brussels wins.
Suppose now that the middle group loses 4 seats to the uppermost and 4 votes to
the lowermost one. Madrid then becomes the Condorcet winner and is thus elected.
This outcome is clearly preferred Brussels by the “losing” group.
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 4, no. 1 13H. Nurmi
To conclude with a provocative question: why bother with gaining a few units of
voting weight if one may be better off with less weight? Of course, the above ﬁctitious
example is a special case, but even so calls attention to features often ignored in the
voting power analysis.
7. Issue packaging
Political skill is sometimes referred to as an explanation of an actor’s success in the
political process. Sometimes a person is described as a skillful negotiator. The skills
referred to then often pertain to ability to spot common gains of the negotiating parties,
to link the problems at hand to a wider context, to inform the negotiating actors of the
views and possible reactions of third parties etc. Political skill is basically the ability
to construct and de-construct packages of issues. It is a form of agenda control and as
such an important determinant of decision outcomes. Moreover, it has nothing to do
with voting weights.
The importance of packaging is shown by the following example which is known
in the literature as Ostrogorski’s paradox (Rae and Daudt 1976).
Table 9. Ostrogorski’s paradox
Voter Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Majority
1 A A B A
2 A B A A
3 B A A A
4 B B B B
5 B B B B
The example summarizes a party contest where parties A and B are competing in a
single-member constituency. Whichever gets more votes is the winner. There are three
electoral issues of equal importance to voters: issues 1–3. Each voter has a stand on
each of the issues and knows the stands of the two parties with adequate certainty to
be able to determine which one is closer to his/her stand on each issue. These closest
parties are depicted in Table 9. Thus, for example, voter 1 thinks that A is closer to
his/her opinion on issue 1 and 2, while B is closer on issue 3.
Assuming that the issues are equally important to all voters, it is reasonable to
assume that each voter votes for the party that is closer to his/her stand on more issues
than the other party. The right-most column indicates the parties voted upon.
It is clear that the packaging has a major role in determining the outcome. With
all three issues subjected simultaneously to an election, A wins, while B would win in
every election should the issues be voted upon separately.
A related phenomenon is known as Anscombe’s paradox. In essence, it says that
under issue-by-issue majority voting it is possible to end up in a situation where a
majority of voters is in a minority—i.e. on the losing side—on a majority of issues.
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The example in Table 10 is an instance of Anscombe’s paradox. Voters 1–3 are on the
losing side on two issue out of three. Yet, they constitute a majority of voters. The
antidote to this paradox is cooperative voting or log-rolling, whereby voters 1–3 would
agree on a joint strategy A on issue 1, B on issue 2 and A on issue 3. The outcome
would be preferable to each one of the three to the BAB outcome that would ensue
without the cooperation.
Table 10. Anscombe’s paradox
Voter Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3
1 B B A
2 A A A
3 A B B
4 B A B
5 B A B
Anscombe’s paradox also stresses the importance of packaging of issues in deter-
mining the outcomes. There is yet another paradox related to packaging of electoral
issues. It is described in Table 11.
Table 11. Anscombe’s paradox and packaging of issues
Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3
3 voters A A A
1 voter A A B
1 voter A B A
1 voter A B B
3 voters B A B
3 voters B B A
1 voter B B B
Majority B A A
If the issues are voted upon separately, the outcome as shown on the last row is
BAA. Looking at the individual voters, we observe, however, that no voter voted for
this package. This possibility is particularly important in contexts where the issues




voting systems, implicitly assume a process whereby the alternatives to be voted upon
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are deﬁned. Sometimes this process takes the form of a debate as e.g. in parliaments,
sometimes an outside body prepares the proposals to be voted upon. Once the pro-
posals are on the table, the actual choice making begins. This can involve bargaining
orvotingorsomemixtureofthetwo. Votingweightsplayaroleinthevotingphaseand
in the bargaining phase. The standard assumption that inspires most real world politi-
cal actors is that the inﬂuence over the ﬁnal decision outcomes is positively associated
with voting weights. We have seen above that this is not always the case. A party or
group may occasionally be better better off with less representation (in terms of voting
weights) than with more thereof.
Mostcommonagenda-basedproceduresassignadisproportionateamountofpower
to the agenda-controller. Indeed, even Pareto violations in outcomes are possible if the
voters vote strictly according to their preferences in each stage of voting. In those
circumstances the voting weights lose their signiﬁcance completely.
The art of designing successful issue bundles or political packages plays an impor-
tant role in determining political outcomes. The issues to be voted upon simply are not
“there”, but are constructed by political actors. Aggregating issues into bundles or dis-
aggregating those bundles are important pieces in the toolbox of a successful politician.
These tools together with the agenda control seem far more important determinants of
decision outcomes than voting weights.
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